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James R. Hines, Jr. 
Structures constitute more than three-quarters of  the U.S.  tangible 
capital stock. Despite their relatively low rates of  depreciation, struc- 
tures account for more than half of  all gross fixed investment in most 
years. Tax  policies potentially have a major impact on both the level 
and composition of  investment in structures. Two aspects of  the tax- 
ation of structures-the  relative burden placed on structures as opposed 
to equipment investment and the nontaxation of owner-occupied hous- 
ing under the income tax-have  attracted substantial attention in recent 
years. This paper explores these two aspects of  the taxation of  in- 
vestments in structures. 
The U.S. Department of the Treasury (1984), in its recent tax reform 
proposal, pointed to the extra tax burdens placed on structures relative 
to equipment as a major defect of  the current Accelerated Cost Re- 
covery System (ACRS). The 1985 Economic Report of  the President 
echoes this sentiment, concluding, “The effective tax rate . . .  is lower 
for equipment than for structures. Because different industries utilize 
different mixes of  capital goods, differential taxation of  assets results 
in differential taxation of  capital income by industry. The average ef- 
fective Federal corporate tax rate on fixed investment varies widely 
by industry.” The decisions of  the Congress in  1984 and 1985 to scale 
back the depreciation benefits to structures but not to equipment is 
perhaps surprising in the light of  these conclusions. 
The allegedly favorable treatment of  owner-occupied housing has 
long been  a target  of  academic critics of  the tax  system, although 
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suggestions for reform have generated little if  any political support. 
The failure to include imputed rent is often treated as a tax subsidy. A 
large literature summarized in Rosen (1985) has estimated the welfare 
loss thought to come from tax-induced changes in tenure choice. And 
the corporate income tax is often opposed on the ground that it ex- 
acerbates the distortions caused by the nontaxation of owner-occupied 
housing. 
While the tax system may well have a potent impact on the level 
and composition of the investment in structures, conventional analyses 
of  this effect are very misleading. This paper reaches two main con- 
clusions on the subject. First, under current tax law, certain types of 
investment in structures are very highly favored. Overall, it is unlikely 
that a significant bias toward equipment and against structures exists 
under current law. Second, the conventional view that the tax system 
is biased in favor of homeownership  is wrong. Because of the possibility 
of  “tax arbitrage” between high-bracket landlords and low-bracket 
tenants, the tax system has long favored rental over ownership  for most 
households. The 1981 reforms, by reducing the top marginal tax rate, 
reduced this bias somewhat. 
Many earlier analyses have reached different conclusions because of 
their failure to take account of  several aspects of  the behavior of real 
world investors who tend to reduce the effective tax burden on struc- 
tures investment. First, structures may be depreciated more than once 
(“churned”) for tax purposes. Particularly where devices can be found 
to reduce the effective rate of  capital gains tax below the statutory 
rate, the effective purchase price of  a structure may be substantially 
reduced by  the knowledge that it can be depreciated several times. 
Second, some types of  structures, particularly commercial buildings, 
are very easy to borrow against because they are quite liquid assets. 
To  the extent that the tax system favors the use of  debt finance they 
too will  be favored. Third, certain types of  investments, especially 
residential rental capital, facilitate tax arbitrage. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 4.1 reviews trends in 
structures investment over the past few years and highlights the dra- 
matic increase in the rate of  investment in commercial buildings that 
has occurred. Section 4.2 describes the tax rules on churning capital 
assets and considers under what circumstances churning will produce 
a tax advantage. Section 4.3 considers the role of  leverage and raises 
the possibility that investments in structures are favored under current 
tax law because of their ability to carry debt. Section 4.4 examines the 
tax advantages to homeownership and shows that the tax law actually 
provides incentives for most households to rent their homes. Section 
4.5 concludes by discussing the implications of these results for tax 
reform and for future research. 39  The Tax Treatment of  Structures 
4.1  Patterns of  Structures Ownership and Investment 
A number of  studies, notably Auerbach (1983)  and Fullerton and 
Henderson (1984), have made rather elaborate calculations of the dead- 
weight losses arising from the failure of the tax system to impose equal 
burdens on different types of  corporate investment. In large part, the 
assumed differential taxation of  equipment and structures drives the 
results of these studies. This differential taxation creates inefficiencies 
in production within industries and also favors some industries at the 
expense of  others. Despite the results of  many academic experts and 
of staff analyses suggesting that the then current law was heavily biased 
in favor of equipment, Congress in  1984 chose to scale back the de- 
preciation benefits associated with investments in  structures but not 
to alter the tax treatment of equipment investments. The 1984 action 
was taken at least in part because of a widespread perception that the 
1981 acceleration  of depreciation  allowances had led to the rapid growth 
of tax shelters based on investments in structures. 
How can one rationalize the perception that structures are a common 
tax shelter vehicle with calculations suggesting that they are among 
the most heavily taxed assets? Part of the answer may be found in the 
composition of the stock of  structures in  1983, the most recent year 
for which data are available. Corporate structures represented less than 
a quarter of all structures in  1983 and less than half of all depreciable 
structures. 
While detailed data are not available on the ownership of different 
types of structures, it is clear that the vast majority of residential capital 
is owner-occupied housing; the bulk of the remaining residential capital 
represents partnerships and proprietorships. Only a negligible fraction 
(2.5%)  of  residential capital is held in corporate form. 
The ownership of nonresidential structures is more complex. It ap- 
pears likely that most of the noncorporate structures are commercial 
buildings owned by partnerships or proprietors. The other main cat- 
egories of nonresidential structures-industrial  buildings, mines, and 
public utility structures-are  probably largely owned by corporations. 
4.1.1  Patterns of  Structures Investment 
Table 4.1 presents some information on the composition of structures 
investment in  1980 before the introduction of ACRS and in  1985. The 
table highlights some aspects of structures investment needed to assess 
neutrality arguments that suggest a tax bias against such investments. 
First, for a substantial share of  structures investment, the effects of 
taxes cannot be analyzed sensibly in isolation. In 1985, for example, 
public utilities accounted for about 20% of all investment in structures. 
The profit rate of most public utilities is regulated; in many cases, the 40  James R. Hines, Jr. 
Table 4.1  Structures Investment in  1980  and 1985 (Billions of Constant 
1982 Dollars) 
1980  1985 
Total Structures Investment  273.8  338.9 
Nonresidential Structures 
Industrial Buildings 
Commercial Buildings 
Office Buildings 
Other 
Education, Religious and Hospital 
Mining and Petroleum 
Public utilities 
Farm structures 
Other 
136.2 
16.0 
34.7 
15.3 
19.4 
7.9 
31.7 
30.3 
6.1 
9.5 
165.8 
14.2 
54.2 
28.3 
25.9 
8.6 
39.8 
31.8 
3.4 
13.8 
Residential structures  137.6  173.1 
Rental  76.9  77.8 
Owner-occupied  60.7  95.3 
Source: Unpublished data, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S.  Department of Commerce. 
benefits associated with tax incentives, especially the investment tax 
credit, are passed on to consumers. 
About 40% of structures investment takes place in forms where other 
public microeconomic policies are involved in guiding the allocation 
of  resources-educational  and hospital buildings, mining and petro- 
leum, and farming. Thus, as with the case of public utilities, examining 
the effects of  tax benefits in isolation is likely to be very misleading. 
For the remaining 40%  of  structures investment, in industrial and 
commercial buildings, tax considerations presumably are of primary 
importance. What is perhaps surprising, though, is that industrial build- 
ings (plants)  represent only about 10% of all nonresidential investments 
in structures. Commercial buildings account for the remaining 30% of 
nonresidential investment in structures. 
Second, the table indicates that there has been a fairly dramatic shift 
in nonresidential investment in structures toward commercial buildings, 
and in particular office buildings, over the last five years. The dollar 
volume of  investment in commercial buildings more than doubled be- 
tween 1980 and 1985, compared with an increase of  less than 50% in 
overall structures investment. The category of industrial buildings has 
been particularly weak over the same period, so investment in com- 
mercial buildings is now four times as great as investment in industrial 
buildings, compared with a ratio of  two to one in 1980. 
It is perhaps ironic that the  1981 tax cut, which had  as a major 
objective spurring corporate investment, has been followed by a dra- 
matic spurt in investment in commercial buildings, much of  which is 41  The Tax Treatment of Structures 
outside the corporate sector. Between 1980 and 1985, real investment 
in commercial structures increased by 56%; of that figure, office build- 
ing investment rose 85%, while overall nonresidential construction in- 
creased only  22%  and investment in  equipment increased 26%.  As 
discussed in detail later, the dramatic divergence between patterns of 
investment in commercial buildings and in other structures raises the 
suspicion that the tax system affects them very differently, despite their 
identical depreciation schedules. 
Table 4.1 also indicates that residential investment has been  sur- 
prisingly strong over the last five years: the dollar volume of residential 
investment has increased by more than 50%, and real investment in 
residential structures has increased by 26%, the same rate of  growth 
as investment in equipment. Virtually all of  the real growth in resi- 
dential investment is attributable to owner-occupied housing, which 
has risen 57% despite the fact that it was the only type of  structure to 
receive no new tax incentives in  198 1. 
4.2  Tax Churning of  Nonresidential Real Property 
As  is now well understood, the present value of  the depreciation 
allowance on a capital asset has an important impact on the incentive 
to invest in that asset. Indeed, differences in the treatment of  depre- 
ciation among assets is often regarded as a major source of non-neutrality 
in the tax system. Unfortunately, calculation of  the present value of 
the depreciation allowances on a given capital asset is not straightfor- 
ward because the assets may be transferred and depreciated more than 
once for tax purposes. Particularly in an inflationary environment, there 
may be large advantages to turning assets over (“churning”) to increase 
their depreciable basis. Even without inflation, asset sales raise the 
value of  prospective depreciation allowances as long as those allow- 
ances are more accelerated than economic depreciation. However, the 
incentive to chum assets is mitigated by the capital gains taxes and 
“recapture” taxes that must be paid when depreciable assets are sold. 
This section examines the effects on investment incentives of  the 
possibility that assets can be depreciated more  than  once. After a 
review of the legal treatment of depreciation allowances and recapture, 
the section analyzes the desirability of  churning different classes of 
assets. The results show the incentive to churn and the related incentive 
to invest to be rather sensitive to both tax rates and assumed discount 
rates. 
4.2.1  Depreciation and Recapture Rules 
The Economic Recovery Tax  Act of  1981 established shorter and 
faster write-offs of  capital costs for new investment in equipment and 42  James R. Hines, Jr. 
structures. The ACRS included a provision for depreciation of most 
classes of structures by a 175% declining balance method over fifteen 
years. The ACRS replaced the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) sys- 
tem, which by comparison was far less generous in its treatment of 
capital depreciation allowances. 
The 1981 tax law permits investors to choose from a variety of options 
for depreciating most classes of  real property. Besides using  175% 
declining balance with switch-over to straight-line over an asset life of 
fifteen years, investors could select a straight-line depreciation method 
for an asset life of fifteen, thirty-five, or forty-five years as they chose. 
Under  normal business  circumstances, of  course,  an investor who 
planned never to sell his assets would always choose the shortest and 
most accelerated depreciation method. However, the recapture pro- 
visions of the law depend on the chosen method of asset depreciation. 
For investors who choose straight-line  depreciation  and who sell their 
assets, the difference between the sales price and the tax basis is treated 
as a capital gain and is taxed at the capital gain rate. However, for 
investors in nonresidential structures who choose the 175% declining 
balance depreciation scheme and who sell their assets at a gain, the 
value of all depreciation allowances taken to date are recaptured as 
ordinary income (rather than as capital gains). This recapture of  all 
past  depreciation deductions normally  is sufficiently costly that  an 
investor would be better off using straight-line depreciation if he or she 
intended to sell the asset at any point. 
Congress has modified the tax treatment of  structures since passage 
of the 1961 act, although not substantially. The 1984 Deficit Reduction 
Act (DEFRA) lengthened the tax lives of  most structures to eighteen 
years and slightly changed the tax treatment of installment sales. Tax 
lives of  structures were further extended to nineteen years in  1985. 
Depreciation and recapture provisions were otherwise unaffected by 
these laws. 
4.2.2  Evaluating the Incentive to Chum 
The feasibility of  churning an asset depends on its characteristics. 
A specialized industrial structure is likely to be difficult to sell because 
its functional specificity limits the range of  potential buyers. It may 
also be difficult to sell and lease back because of the moral hazard and 
other problems associated with rental contracts. Most commercial real 
estate, on the other hand, is not highly specialized and is therefore 
easily leased. Indeed, Pan Am rents space in the Pan Am Building and 
Exxon rents its space in Rockefeller Center. A natural conjecture then 
is that, if the tax benefits to churning are substantial, a significant tax 
distortion may be created in favor of  liquid assets. I explore this pos- 
sibility by considering the magnitude of the tax incentive for the churn- 
ing of  commercial buildings. 43  The Tax Treatment of Structures 
Consider an investor, corporate or noncorporate, who invests in a 
commercial building in 1985, expecting that the tax law, inflation, and 
the interest rate will not change in the future. There are three possible 
depreciation strategies. First, the investor can use accelerated depre- 
ciation (with straight-line switch-over) and never churn the asset. Sec- 
ond, the investor can use accelerated depreciation  and churn at the 
optimal point.  Third, the firm can use straight-line depreciation and 
churn at the optimal point. 
The potential tax benefits of churning are sensitive to the choice of 
capital gains tax rate. Previous calculations of the tax effects of asset 
sales have assumed that all capital gains are taxed upon realization at 
the statutory rate. Particularly for individuals, but to some extent for 
corporations as well, there are devices available that permit  capital 
gains taxes to be avoided or deferred. This makes the churning of assets 
much more attractive. The features of the tax system that permit capital 
gains taxes to be avoided or  reduced in present value include installment 
sales, variations in marginal tax rates, step-ups  in basis, artificially 
generated losses, and outright cheating. Of these, the most important 
is probably the widespread use of installment sales, which delay and 
therefore reduce the real cost of capital gains taxes. These features are 
described in detail in Gordon, Hines, and Summers (1987). 
The combination of these factors suggests that capital gains arising 
when structures investments are churned are effectively taxed at much 
less than the statutory rate. Therefore, the calculations also consider 
the incentives for churning that arise when individuals’ capital gains 
are completely untaxed and when they are taxed at half the statutory 
rate, as well as corporations’ incentives when their capital gains are 
taxed at half and three-quarters the statutory rate. 
4.2.3  Results 
Table 4.2  reports values  of  net before-tax  corporate  depreciation 
allowances and effective tax rates for representative parameter values, 
described in Gordon et al. (1987). The table presents results for inves- 
tors with 2% required real rates of return. As Summers (1987) argues, 
if  anything, this rate is higher than those suggested by theory but is 
rather lower than those actually used by corporations. This and other 
parameters used are standard in the literature on effective tax rates. 
For the churning scenarios, it is assumed that the firm chooses the 
depreciation method and interval between asset sales so as to maximize 
profits. As this table makes clear, corporations will seldom want to 
churn structures for tax reasons under current law. This is hardly sur- 
prising, since the recapture provisions of the tax law were designed to 
prevent such transactions. If the marginal corporate investor faces less 
than the statutory capital gains rate, then it may become slightly pre- 
ferrable to churn structures. 44  James R. Hines, Jr. 
'IIPble 4.2  Depredation Bene5ta and Effective "bx Rates 
Corporations: Depreciation Method 
~~  ~ 
Churning: Effective Capital Gains Rate 
Accelerated 
Inflation Rate  Depreciation  0.14  0.21  0.28 
3% 
6% 
0.69 
(37%) 
0.58 
(44%) 
0.81  0.71  0.59 
0.60  0.48  0.36 
(26%)  (36%)  (44%) 
(43%)  (50%)  (55%) 
10%  0.47  0.41  0.33  0.24 
(SOW  (53%)  (58%)  (59%) 
Individuals: Depreciation Method 
Accelerated 
Inflation Rate  Depreciation 
3%  0.69 
(41%) 
6%  0.58 
(48%) 
10%  0.47 
(54%) 
Churning: Effective Capital Gains Rate 
0.00  0.10  0.20 
1.06  0.90  0.75 
(- 14%)  (18%)  (35%) 
0.85  0.68  0.53 
(26%)  (42%)  (51%) 
0.69  0.48  0.36 
(41%)  (54%)  (59%) 
Note: Top entry is the present value of depreciation  benefits; bottom entry in parentheses 
is the corresponding effective tax rate. 
The bottom panel of  table 4.2 presents similar calculations for top- 
bracket individuals who invest in structures through such devices as 
partnerships or proprietorships. As the table suggests, individuals have 
much stronger incentives to churn structures than corporations do. The 
top individual tax rate for ordinary income is 50%, and the top capital 
gains rate is 20%.  Even ignoring the likely ability of  individuals to 
avoid more of their capital gains liability than corporations, the 30% 
spread between the ordinary income and statutory capital gains rate is 
a much stronger incentive for churning than the 18%  spread faced by 
corporations. 
At a 3% rate of inflation, individuals always choose to chum their 
assets. If they can avoid capital gains taxes, they may face negative 
effective tax rates. Even at higher inflation rates, churning is a tax- 
preferred activity for individuals. Whether corporations or individuals 
face higher effective tax rates at a particular inflation rate may depend 
on their marginal capital gains rates. The source of funds matters as 
well, since the double taxation of  corporate earnings may make the 
required corporate rate of return for new savings capital substantially 45  The Tax  Treatment of Structures 
higher than the rate for, say, partnership investors. Section 4.3 treats 
this issue in more depth, but it is sufficient at this point to note that 
individuals may face strong incentives to invest in structures and sell 
them Iater. In particular, these results suggest that the tax code favors 
individual rather than corporate ownership of  structures. 
4.2.4  The Extent of Churning 
The limited available empirical evidence suggests that churning is an 
important part of the depreciation strategy for investors in structures. 
Table 4.3 presents data on the depreciation methods chosen by cor- 
porations and partnerships for their structures investments in 1981 and 
1982. Corporations used straight-line depreciation for 38% of the value 
of their structures investments in 1981 and for 33% in 1982. Except in 
very unusual circumstances, stmight-line depreciation makes sense only 
when firms plan to sell their assets at some date. In addition, under 
able  4.3  Choice of Deprechtion Method under ACRS (Milllous of 
Current Dollars) 
1981  1982 
Corporations 
Total  allocabte fifteen-year real property 
oiher than low-income housing and 
public utility property 
Accelerated depreciation 
m 
Straight-line  , 
(%) 
Unall~cable  property, foreign property, 
and tax-exempt organizations 
Total docable fifteen-year real property 
other than low-income housing and 
public utility property 
Partnerships 
Accelerated depreciation 
(%) 
Stmght-line 
(%) 
Unallocable property, foreign property, 
and tax-exempt organizations 
24,836 
15,474 
(62.3%) 
9,362 
(37.7%) 
6,171 
29,044 
11,700 
(40.3%) 
17,344 
(59.7%) 
1,879 
25,276 
16,923 
(67.0%) 
(33.0%) 
8,353 
5,294 
46,553 
18,344 
(39.4%) 
28,209 
(60.6%) 
1,492 
Source: Unpublished preliminary data, Statistics of Income Division, Internal Revenue 
Service. 
Note: Entries correspond to dollar values of  fifteen-year  real property (other than low- 
income housing  and public utility structures)  put in place and depreciated by the indicated 
method in these years. Unallocable property could not reliably be assigned to either the 
accelerated or  straight-line depreciation category. These data exclude investments for 
which  the IRS was  unable to determine from the txx form which type of  capital was 
being depreciated. 46  James R. Hines, Jr. 
the generous pre-1984 recapture rules for installment sales, some firms 
may have used accelerated depreciation even if they wanted to chum 
their assets later. Through such extensive use of straight-line depre- 
ciation, the corporate sector gives up the substantial tax benefits of 
acceleration presumably in order to avoid costly recapture when the 
structures are sold later. 
The bottom panel of table 4.3 presents far more striking information 
on partnerships. Fully 60% of the value of structures put in place by 
partnerships since the introduction of ACRS was depreciated straight- 
line. Of course, this is quite consistent with the finding that churning 
can be very attractive for individual investors and that individuals are 
more likely than corporations to take advantage of churning. The 60% 
figure in table 4.3 is likely to understate the extent of straight-line use 
for nonresidential investment, since the entry includes residential in- 
vestment other than low-income housing.  The absence of a special 
recapture penalty makes it very likely that partnerships use accelerated 
depreciation for their residential investments; the fraction of nonresi- 
dential structures depreciated straight-line is probably above 60%. The 
results in this section suggest that taking account of the attractiveness 
of tax churning may help to explain the recent boom in commercial 
building. 
4.3  Corporate Financial Policy and the Effective Tax Rates on 
Structures Investment 
So far,#this  analysis has considered features of the tax treatment of 
investments  in  structures that are common to individual  investors, 
partnerships, and corporations. The current conventional wisdom that 
current tax law favors equipment over structures is derived from studies 
that have focused on corporate rather than overall investment.  The 
calculations underlying  these claims  are almost always based  on a 
variant of the formula for the user cost of capital derived by Hall and 
Jorgenson (1967). This formula, however, ignores a variety of factors, 
among them personal taxes and corporate financial policy. This section 
argues that, when the effects of personal taxes and corporate financial 
policy are taken into account, there is a much smaller difference be- 
tween the calculated effective tax rates on structures and equipment 
and perhaps even a tax advantage to investments in structures. 
The tax  law  seems to treat  debt-financed  investments  favorably. 
Therefore, to the degree that a project can be financed with debt, it 
becomes more attractive. Investments in structures should be financed 
much more easily with debt than investments in equipment: structures 
are used as collateral for a loan easily, there is a dense secondary market 
for most types of buildings where a creditor can go if  the collateral 47  The Tax Treatment of Structures 
must be liquidated, and the market value of a building used as collateral 
is normally much more predictable than the values of  many other as- 
sets. Therefore, a firm should be able to obtain a much larger loan on 
a building than on many other assets without imposing any effective 
default risk on the lender. 
At the margin, corporations have a tax incentive toward debt finance. 
Corporate income is taxable both under the corporate tax and again, 
either as dividends or as capital gains, under the shareholders’  personal 
income tax, while income accruing directly to shareholders is taxable 
only under the personal tax. For the same return, shareholders would 
thus prefer to loan money to the firm as debt rather than to purchase 
shares whose return is taxed twice. Corporate financing costs reflect 
this preference, so debt finance is less expensive. 
In spite of  this tax incentive to use debt finance, firms do not use 
debt exclusively because the possibility of bankruptcy leads to conflicts 
of interest between debt and equity holders, with associated real costs. 
There is every reason, however, to expect the optimal value of  the 
debt-value ratio to vary by type of  capital, for the reasons described 
above. It should also vary by industry, and observed debt-value ratios 
do. According to the figures reported in Fullerton and Gordon (1983) 
for a select group of industries in 1973, the observed debt-value ratios 
ranged from 0.08 in construction to 0.787 in real estate. The average 
in the economy was 0.399. 
Given plausible parameter values and an assumed ability to finance 
new structures investments with 40% more debt than would be possible 
for equipment, the estimated effective tax rate on  structures drops 
dramatically from 0.421 to 0.193. In contrast, the estimated effective 
tax rate on equipment reported by Auerbach (1983) for 1982 was 0.084. 
At least with these parameter values, the difference becomes minor. 
These results are sensitive to the choice of interest rate, debt-value 
ratio, and tax rates for marginal investors. Gordon et al. (1987) describe 
the calculations, which show effective tax rates to be as low as 7% in 
other realistic scenarios. 
4.4  Taxation and Tenure Choice 
It is widely believed that the tax system favors owner-occupied hous- 
ing. This conclusion is repeated in many textbooks and forms the basis 
for much research on the effects of  taxation on tenure choice. The 
standard argument is straightforward. The services of owner-occupied 
housing are untaxed while rental payments are treated as taxable in- 
come. While landlords are permitted tax deductions that are not per- 
mitted to homeowners, as long as there is some positive effective tax 
rate on rental income, home ownership is nonetheless thought to be 48  James R. Hines, Jr. 
tax favored. As a number of authors, including Litzenberger and Sosin 
(1977), Titman (1982), and Hendershott (1987), have recognized, there 
is an important defect in this argument. It ignores the possibility of tax 
arbitrage between high-bracket landlords and low-bracket tenants. High- 
bracket taxpayers have a comparative advantage over low-bracket tax- 
payers in making use of  interest deductions that they can exploit by 
borrowing in order to buy real estate that they then rent to low-bracket 
taxpayers. 
When this effect is recognized, it turns out that homeownership is 
tax favored for only a small number of taxpayers. This section dem- 
onstrates that conclusion by considering the effects of homeownership 
in a setting where people would be indifferent between owning and 
renting their homes except for tax incentives. In reality, of  course, 
other considerations such as transaction costs, desire to own one’s 
own place of residence, and the differing incentive effects of rental and 
ownership contracts influence tenure choice. But in order to study the 
incentives provided by the tax system, the calculations abstract from 
these effects. 
It is straightforward to calculate the costs of  owner-occupied and 
rental housing. I assume that competition forces rents down to the 
point  where landlords earn the  same risk-adjusted return on  rental 
property as they could on bonds. This assumption is warranted as long 
as landlords can borrow or lend at the margin. It will become apparent 
that top-bracket landlords will be able to charge the lowest rents and 
so represent the marginal supplier of  rental housing. 
Under. ACRS,  residential property was permitted  175%  declining 
balance depreciation over a useful life of  fifteen years (now nineteen 
years). In addition, residential property has the desirable feature that 
accelerated depreciation is recaptured upon  sale at ordinary income 
rates only to the extent that it has exceeded straight-line depreciation. 
The 1981 act also permits purchasers of  used assets to use the 175% 
declining balance depreciation method. Prior to 1981, asset lives were 
substantially longer, but investors in new residential structures were 
allowed 200% declining balance (or sum-of-the-years-digits)  deprecia- 
tion. Purchasers of  used assets were required to use  125% declining 
balance depreciation, thereby lowering the prices of  used  structures 
relative to new structures, and reducing the value of tax churning. High 
marginal tax rates on individuals provided ample incentive for invest- 
ment in rental housing, however. 
Table 4.4 presents values of  marginal tax rates for individuals who 
were indifferent between homeownership and renting for the years 
1965-85.  The results in table 4.4 describe four scenarios. I examine 
cases in  which individuals who own rental housing avoid half  their 
capital gains liability at the margin and cases in which they pay the full 49  The  Tax Treatment of Structures 
%bIe  4.4  Tenure Cbolce and Tnx  Shtxw, 1965-85 (5%) 
Minimum Tax Bracket for Owner-Occupiers 
Full Capital Gains 
Liability  Liability 
One-Half Capital Gains 
Maximum Mnal  Risky  Riskless  Risky  Riskless 
Year  Tax  Bracket  Returns  Returns  Returns  Returns 
. 
1%S  70 
1970  73 
1975  70 
1980  70 
1981  69 
1982  50 
1983  50 
1984  50 
1985  50 
0 
24 
59 
55 
53 
32 
28 
19 
11 
64 
62 
59 
63 
56 
50 + 
SO 
34 
23 
0 
27 
59 
56 
53 
41 
38 
37 
13 
70 -b 
69 
59 
64 
56 
50 + 
50 +. 
44 
29 
Note: Entries correBpond  to  break-even tax rates  for tenure choice. Taxpayers with 
lower marginal tax rates will be renters, and those with higher marginal rates  will be 
owner-occupiers. 
statutory rate  on capital gains. In addition,  I separately report speci- 
fications in which investors treat depreciation allowances as risky and 
in which they are viewed as riskless. 
The striking implication of the findings reported in table 4.4 is that 
home ownership has not been favored by the tax code until recently. 
High individud tax rates before 1982 encouraged most taxpayers to 
rent their dwellings from top-rate individuals. While the results in table 
4.4 reflect changing inflation and interest rates as well as  statutory tax 
changes. The  conchion that falling personal taxes have undone changes 
in  the  depreciation provisions to make homeownership much more- 
attractive in  recent years is inescapable. From this perspective, it is 
perhaps not surprising that home  ownership and residential investment 
have been strong in recent years. 
4.5  Condusion~ 
This paper highlights the difficulty of  predicting the effects of  tax 
rules on the  level and composition of investment. The incentives for 
investment in the tax  law  turn out to  depend on a number of  quite 
specific features ofthe law, rather than just on tax  rates and depreciation 
schedules. They also depend on how the  tax law  interacts with the 
liquidity characteristics of different types of assets. Analyses that omit 
these factors are  Likely  to have fttk predictive power for the effects 
of tax changes on the composition  of investment. Moreover, normative 50  James R. Hines, Jr. 
conclusions based on models that omit these factors are likely to be 
very misleading. 
This paper implies that  there are at  most minimal allocative losses 
resulting from the differential treatment of  equipment and structures 
under current depreciation schedules. There are substantial reasons to 
believe that residential and nonresidential real estate investments made 
by  partnerships are  substantially favored under current law, because 
of  the  tax advantages associated with churning assets, leverage, and 
arbitrage between taxpayers in different brackets. 
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